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THE DEFENSE OF "GOOD FAITH" UNDER SECTION 1983
London v. Florida Dep't of Health and Rehabilitative Services Div. of
Family Services, 313 F. Supp. 591 (N.D. Fla. 1970)
Plaintiff, a case worker with the Florida Department of Health and
Rehabilitative Services, was transferred to departmental offices in an-
other county by the District Welfare Board as a result of complaints
lodged against him by several county officials. The complaints arose
because of manner and speech displayed by plaintiff in areas outside the
realm of his employment.1 On appeal, the State Merit System Council
approved the transfer. Plaintiff commenced work in the county to which
he had been transferred but shortly thereafter was dismissed from all
employment. The Council upheld his dismissal, and plaintiff brought
suit in the Northern District of Florida under 42 U.S.C. § 19832 alleging
that both the transfer and the dismissal encroached on his first amend-
ment freedoms.3 The court held that plaintiffs first amendment rights
were not violated by the transfer because he had a duty to "comply with
the reasonable requirements and regulations established by the Depart-
ment. One of these requirements was that employees not engage in com-
munity controversies that might disrupt the effective performance of
their duty."' 4 The court concluded that the Board in "good faith" be-
lieved that plaintiff's effectiveness as a case worker was impaired by
these activities.
The conflict between constitutional rights and legitimate concern over
the action of public employees has been a recurring theme in recent
I. London v. Florida Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Services Div. of Family Services, 313 F.
Supp. 591, 596 (N.D. Fla. 1970).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of
any State or Territory, subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States
or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws shall be liable to the party injured in
an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
3. It was also alleged by plaintiff that the transfer and dismissal were the result of racial prejudice
and based on arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable Board action, and that on the appeal of his
dismissal order he was denied the right of discovery. The court dismissed these contentions on the
grounds that plaintiff failed to carry the burden of proving that racial prejudice was the motivating
force of the Board's action, there was substantial evidence to support the transfer and dismissal,
and plaintiff did not prove that he was "deprived of opportunity to test, explain or refute the
testimony before the Council, or that he was not given a full and fair hearing."
4. 313 F. Supp. at 596.
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years.' Accompanying this trend is the realization of the usefulness of
§ 1983 in seeking direct redress for harm sustained from wrongful state
action.6 Further, there is support for the position that when the Civil
Rights Act of 1871 was adopted, Congress intended to eliminate the
common law immunity from suit afforded judges, legislators, and, to a
lesser extent, administrative officials under the Act. 7 The Supreme Court
in Tenney v. Brandhove,8 however, held that Congress did not intend to
do away with legislative immunity in this area. The Court said: "We
cannot believe that Congress-itself a staunch advocate of legislative
freedom-would impinge on a tradition so well grounded in history and
reason by covert inclusion in the general language before us." 9 The lower
courts were quick to extend this decision to the judiciary and governmen-
tal officials even though the Supreme Court had not ruled on the mat-
ter. 10 Subsequently, in Monroe v. Pape," the Supreme Court held that
5 Although one has no constitutional right to public employment, Adler v. Board of Educ., 342
U.S. 485 (1952), constitutional protection is afforded to those persons whose exclusion is clearly
arbitrary or discriminatory. Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252 (1957); Schware v. Board of
Bar Examiners. 353 U.S. 232 (1957); Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956).
Similarly, the government cannot attempt to achieve its objectives by methods which broadly stifle
the fundamental liberties of its employees when these objectives can be more narrowly achieved.
Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960). The
employment of teachers may not be terminated, nor may teachers constitutionally be compelled to
abandon their first amendment rights because of the exercise of freedoms guaranteed by the Consti-
tution. Pickering v. Board of Educ.. 391 U.S. 563 (1968); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 355 U.S.
589 (1967); Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344
U.S. 183 (1952). This constitutional protection is the same whether or not the person is tenured
under state law. Johnson v. Branch. 364 F.2d 177 (4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1003
(1967). Likewise, it makes no difference if a dismissal occurs in the middle of a contract period or
if the contract is simply not renewed for the next year. McLaughlin v. Tilendis, 398 F.2d 287 (7th
Cir 1968).
6. For a plaintiff to state a cause of action under § 1983 he must allege: (I) the conduct
complained of was done under color of state law; and (2) this conduct subjected plaintiff to a
deprivation of rights, privileges, or immunities secured to him by the Constitution and laws. See
Orr v. Trinter, 444 F.2d 128 (6th Cir. 1971); Orr v. Thorpe, 427 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1970); Jones
v. Hopper, 410 F.2d 1323 (10th Cir.). cert. denied, 397 U.S. 991 (1969); Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d
74 (3d Cir. 1965); Cohen v. Norris, 300 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1962).
7. Cobb v. City of Maiden, 202 F.2d 701 (Ist Cir. 1953); Pickering v. Pennsylvania R. Co.. 152
F.2d 240. 250 (3d Cir. 1945); Note, The Proper Scope of the Civil Rights Acts, 66 HARV. L. REV.
1285, 1295 (1953).
8. 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
9. Id. at 376.
10, Nelson v. Knox. 256 F.2d 312 (6th Cir. 1958); Cuikas v. City of Mansfield, 250 F.2d 700
(6th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 US. 937 (1958); Tate v. Arnold, 223 F.2d 782 (8th Cir. 1955);
Cawley v. Warren, 216 F.2d 74 (7th Cir. 1954); Cobb v. City of Malden, 202 F.2d 701 (1st Cir.
1953); Francis v. Crafts, 203 F.2d 809 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 835 (1953); McGuire v.
Todd, 198 F.2d 60 (5th Cir.), cert. denied. 344 U.S. 835 (1952).
I1. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
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it was not necessary to allege wilfulness to be successful in stating a cause
of action under § 1983. The Court stated: "Section 1979 [42 U.S.C.
§ 1983] should be read against the background of tort liability that
makes a man responsible for the natural consequences of his actions."' 12
This statement caused confusion in the lower courts over whether the
Supreme Court had held that governmental immunity was no longer
available in a suit brought under § 1983.1 The question was resolved in
Pierson v. Ray, 4 where the Court found that the question of immunity
had not been presented in Monroe and therefore Monroe should not be
read to foreclose the defense of good faith and probable cause. Rather,
"[p]art of the background of tort liability, in the case of police officers
making an arrest, is the defense of good faith and probable cause." 5
The importance of Monroe and Pierson in relation to the principal
case is their view that common law defenses to torts are available under
§ 1983 and, in particular, that the doctrine of common law immunity
is applicable. It has been said that no other doctrine has limited the
effectiveness of § 1983 more than that of official immunity."6
The immunity the common law afforded administrative officials was
not absolute but qualified.17 Chief Judge Magruder of the First Circuit
12. Id. at 187.
13. Striker v. Pancher, 317 F.2d 780 (6th Cir. 1963); Cohen v. Norris, 300 F.2d 24 (9th Cir.
1962); Hardwick v. Hurley, 289 F.2d 529 (7th Cir. 1961).
14. 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
15. Id. at 556-57. The question in Pierson was whether the defense of "good faith and probable
cause" put forth at the trial was a sufficient defense under § 1983. The court answered in the
affirmative on the ground that the defense was "part of the background of tort liability." The Court
was not addressing itself to the question of whether "probable cause" and "good faith" are
required or whether "probable cause" alone would be a sufficient defense under common law
immunity.
16. Note, The Civil Rights Act ofl871: Continuing Vitality, 40 NOTRE DAME LAW. 70 (1964).
17. The immunity which the common law conferred upon judges, legislators, and high ranking
executive officials was an absolute immunity from suit for acts done within their authority. The
immunity extended even to acts done negligently or maliciously. It was felt, however, that the
reasons present for allowing an unqualified immunity to judges, legislators and governmental
executives were not present with respect to administrative officials. A limiting factor imposed on
the immunity of administrative officials was the requirement that the jurisdictional fact be present.
This approach, some courts felt, imposed harsh results on those officials who were acting in their
discretion and in good faith. These courts, therefore, drew a distinction between "discretionary"
and "ministerial" officials. The test used to differentiate between the two was whether the law
required that a particular thing be done without qualification. If so, then the official was ministerial
and the immunity did not apply to unauthorized acts. This test was often difficult to apply. The
courts, therefore, moved to a requirement of a showing of bad faith or malice in mQst instances.
See Jennings, Tort Liability of Administrative Officers, 21 MINN. L. REv. 263 (1937); Keefe,
Personal Tort Liability ofAdministrative Officials, 12 FORDHArI L. REV. 130 (1943).
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Court of Appeals in 1953 defined the qualified immunity doctrine in a
concurring opinion in Cobb v. City of Malden:"
Hence I take it as a roughly accurate generalization that members of a
city council, and other public officers not in the exceptional category of
officers having complete immunity, would have a qualified privilege, giv-
ing them a defense against civil liability, for harms caused by acts done
by them in good faith in performance of their official duty as they under-
stood it."
For an administrative official to be able today to invoke a defense of
immunity at common law it is necessary that he be acting in good faith.
This same defense, following the reasoning of Pierson, would be avail-
able in an action brought under § 1983.
In employing the test of good faith, however, a difficulty arises over
how the courts are to determine if "good faith" is present. Should the
test be restricted only to what the official actually intended, his subjec-
tive state of mind, or may it also include an examination of the reasona-
bleness of his actions in view of the surrounding circumstances? It is only
after examining the result of a case in this area and the particular fact
situation involved that it becomes clear which standard has been impli-
citly invoked. As the excerpt from Cobb suggests, the subjective method
was employed in the developed common law.2" The court in the principal
case seems to be employing the same standard. An examination of cases
closely analogous to the principal one indicates, however, that the courts
are not in agreement as to which type of inquiry is to be utilized in
connection with the statute. 2'
In Smith v. Board of Education of Morrilton School District No.
32,2 the staff of an all black school was dismissed upon the opening of
a new public school because only a few students chose to go to their
school on the basis of a "freedom of choice" desegregation plan. The
court, holding that the teachers stated a cause of action, said: "The use
18. 202 F.2d 701 (1st Cir. 1953).
19. Id. at 707.
20. See generally Jennings, Tort Liability of Administrative Officers, 21 MINN. L. REv. 263
(1937); Keefe, Personal Tort Liability of Administrative Officials, 12 FORDHAM L. REV. 130
(1943).
21. See Pred v. Board of Public Instr., 415 F.2d 851 (5th Cir. 1969); Freeman v. Gould Special
School Dist., 405 F.2d 1153 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 843 (1969); Smith v. Board of Educ.,
365 F.2d 770 (8th Cir. 1966); Johnson v. Branch, 364 F.2d 177 (4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 1003 (1967); Roth v. Board of Regents, 310 F. Supp. 972 (W.D. Wis. 1970); Bradford v.
School Dist., 244 F. Supp. 786 (E.D. S.C. 1965), affd, 364 F.2d 185 (4th Cir. 1966).
22. 365 F.2d 770 (8th Cir. 1966).
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of the freedom of choice plan, associated with the fact of a new high
school plant, produced a result which the superintendent must have
anticipated, despite his testimony that he 'rather guessed' that the Sulli-
van School would continue to operate." ' 3 The court employed an objec-
tive test to make its determination. Not only does it take into account
what the superintendent thought, but it also examines the circumstances
surrounding the origin of the dispute. However, the disadvantage of such
an inquiry is the danger that the courts will engage in second-guessing
the decisions of administrative officials.
An even more stringent standard was employed, perhaps inadvert-
ently, in McLaughlin v. Tilendis24 where former probationary school
teachers brought an action under § 1983 against the superintendent of
the school district and the elected members of the school board. They
alleged that the discontinuance of their employment was based on their
involvement in union activities. The district court dismissed the com-
plaint on the ground that the first amendment confers no right to join a
union. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, reversing, said that teach-
ers have the right of free association and any unjustified interference with
this freedom violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. The court then addressed itself to the qualified immunity enjoyed
by these officials. The court said: "At best, defendants' qualified im-
munity in this case means that they can prevail only if they show that
the plaintiffs were discharged on justifiable grounds."2 5 The requirement
stated here, by placing the burden of proof on the defendant, obviously
goes further than the Smith formulation. The test in Smith placed the
burden of proof on the plaintiff but allowed him to show that in light of
the surrounding circumstances the defendant could not reasonably have
been acting in good faith. The majority of cases do not place the burden
of proof on the official.2 1
The courts have not always distinguished, even implicitly, between
subjective and objective determination of good faith. In the case of
Freeman v. Gould Special School District,27 teachers whose contracts
23. Id. at 779.
24. 398 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1968).
25. Id. at 290-91.
26. Pred v. Board of Public Instr., 415 F.2d 851 (5th Cir. 1969); Smith v. Board of Educ.,
365 F.2d 770 (8th Cir. 1966); Johnson v. Branch, 364 F.2d 177 (4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 1003 (1967); James v. West Virginia Bd. of Regents, 322 F. Supp. 217 (S.D. W.Va. 1971);
McGee v. Richmond Unified School Dist., 306 F. Supp. 1052 (N.D. Cal. 1969); Parine v. Levine,
274 F. Supp. 268 (E.D. Mich. 1967).
27. 405 F.2d 1153 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 843 (1969).
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were not going to be renewed brought an action under § 1983. The
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, in upholding the district court's deci-
sion, said: "From the evidence, it appears the Board acted in good
faith. .. .*"I The majority opinion made clear that when the discretion
of administrative officials is exercised in good faith and in accordance
with the law the courts will not interfere. The court went on to say:
School boards are representatives of the people, and should have wide
latitude and discretion in the operation of the school district, including
employment and rehiring practices. Local autonomy must be maintained
to allow continued democratic control of education as a primary state
function, subject only to clearly enunciated legal and constitutional re-
strictions."5
The court in the case of Jones v. Hopper31 clearly required the use of
an especially stringent subjective standard. This court, citing a 1905
decision,3 1 held that the decision of an administrative agency is not a
proper subject of review in a tort action unless fraud or equivalent
wrongdoing is present. Most of the courts employing the subjective stan-
dard do not apply such a harsh principle from the plaintiff's point of
view.32
From the foregoing analysis it becomes clear that a uniform, identifia-
ble standard has not evolved in the application of the "good faith"
doctrine of immunity in this area. The ambiguous character of the prin-
ciple can no doubt be attributed to the application of common law
immunity to § 1983 despite the specific policy considerations'arising
under that statute. Parochial definitions of common law immunity have
made the legislative mandate that -[e]very person . . . shall be liable
. . .. "- depend upon the forum in which the suit is brought.
Certainly the qualified immunity which these officials enjoy serves a
useful purpose.34 A statute which was created to protect an individual's
28. Id. at 1160.
29. Id. at 1161.
30, 410 F.2d 1323 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 991 (1969).
3 1, Ward v. Board of Regents, 138 F. 372 (8th Cir. 1905).
32. Freeman v. Gould Special School Dist., 405 F.2d 1153 (8th Cir.), cert. denied 396 U.S. 843
(1969); Roth v. Board of Regents. 310 F. Supp. 972 (W.D. Wis. 1970); Bradford v. School Dist.,
244 Supp. 768 (E.D. S.C. 1965), affd 364 F.2d 185 (4th Cir. 1966); Seay v. Patterson, 207 F. Supp.
755 (M.D. Ala. 1962).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
34. Arguments in favor of immunity for administrative officials are: (1) the need to free officials
from vexatious law suits; (2) the unfairness of asking a person to make a decision and then holding
him liable for the decision he makes; (3) the delay that accompanies such law suits; and (4) the
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constitutional and legal rights, privileges and immunities should, never-
theless, have a more definite interpretation. That interpretation should
rest upon the uniform application of an objective test of "good faith."
Aside from the obvious advantage of homogeneity, this approach would
further the attainment of an equilibrium between § 1983 and the quali-
fied privilege. This equilibrium would help each better to achieve its
purpose with minimum impairment of the other.
For those who would argue that this outcome would result in a signifi-
cant shift in policy for those courts which employ the subjective stan-
dard, it is to be remembered that both parties to litigation equally de-
serve the protection which the law affords. By the imposition of a subjec-
tive standard, the doctrine of qualified immunity is being advanced an
unnecessary step at the expense of the remedy afforded by § 1983. The
difficulty in proving that a person was not consciously acting in good
faith imposes a harsh burden on a plaintiff.
fear that constant suits would hamper the agency's efficiency. See Jennings, Tort Liability of
Administrative Officers, 21 MINN. L. REV. 263 (1937); Keefe, Personal Tort Liability of Adminis-
trative Officials, 12 FORDHAM L. REv. 130 (1943).
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